Reverend David C. Trosch
Post Office Box 389
Magnolia Springs, Alabama 36555-0389
I received from Abbot Victor Clark at St. Bernard, because I had requested it, a verified notice of the information you gave me verbally September 20 that you had repudiated the obedience which you formally accepted in leaving the Abbey on your own and returning to Mobile contrary to our original understanding and my expressed provisions for you to remain there for a period of prayerful reflection.
I regret this and, once again, formally invite you to comply with a precept which I now make in a written form through this letter that you return to the Abbey as we had previously agreed. I am anxious that the process which I envisioned, and with which you began to cooperate, albeit onesidedly, continue. To that end I am enclosing one of the theological reflections I requested on the issue you raised as to the justifiable homicide of abortionists. The material is from Father Michael J. Walsh, who served as the Executive Secretary to the Committee on Doctrine of the NCCB for some five years and during my chairmanship of that committee. He is a sound balanced theologian of national reputation, and I certainly hope you will give his thoughts careful consideration. I am awaiting a second paper, done at my request, from Father John Boyle a classmate in whom I have every confidence and a professional theologian who teaches that subject and acts as a consultant to the Committee on Doctrine. I will forward this material as soon as I receive it.
Meanwhile, your actions thus far have made it impossible for me to continue you as Administrator at St. John's Parish, Magnolia Springs, and you are hereby relieved of that office. Your faculties remain withdrawn so that your status as a public minister in the name of the Church is currently inoperative. (Lest there be any confusion, your public concelebration such as took place on the occasion of Father Tellier's funeral was at variance with this provision. At another level, I find it even less understandable in view of your previously stated willful disobedience to my request that you return to St. Bernard Abbey.)
. . . . . . . . . . . For just cause, in accord with the norm of canon 193.3,
. . . . . . . . . . . the Reverend David C. Trosch is hereby removed as
. . . . . . . . . . . administrator of Saint John's Parish in Magnolia Springs,
. . . . . . . . . . . Alabama.
. . . . . . . . . . . Anything to the contrary notwithstanding.
. . . . . . . . . . . Given at Mobile this twenty-eighth day of October 1993.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +/Oscar H. Lipscomb/
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Most Reverend Oscar H. Lipscomb
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Archbishop of Mobile
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . /Rev. G. Warren Wall/
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Very Reverend G. Warren Wall
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chancellor
Below is the theological position developed by Rev. Michael J. Walsh
at the request
of Archbishop Oscar H. Lipscomb. Submitted on October 21, 1993
1. Father Trosch attempts to justify the homicide of Dr. Gunn by appealing to the right of defense of innocent human life. All moralists acknowledge that such a right exists, but they rather carefully set forth essential considerations about the use of this right. Noldin seems to distinguish between a right of self-defense and a right to defend the life of an innocent third party against unjust aggression. In discussing the right of self-defense, Noldin establishes a right based in natural law to defend one's life against unjust aggression. But he insists that the exercise of that right demands the application of the Principle of the Double Effect. Only that force which is necessary and sufficient to repel the attack may be justified. Thus one could not use deadly force if less harmful means are available. And one may never directly intend the death of the unjust aggressor. One may only resort to forceful defense at the actual moment when the attack is taking place. To use force in anticipation of being attacked or in response to an attack that has ceased cannot be justified, and a person who inflicts harm or death in either of these circumstances is both morally, and in most cases, legally guilty of assault or homicide.
In regard to a right to defend the life of an innocent third parry against unjust aggression, Noldin appeals to the principle that what one may licitly do in regard to oneself may also be done in regard to another. Indeed, there may be times when charity or the holding of a public office or familial bonds make such defense of an innocent third party necessary. But Noldin insists that the debilitating effects of such action are so great personally and socially, that as a practical matter individuals may resort to the forceful defense of an innocent third party only because they hold a public office, e.g., police, or because of close familial bonds ("ratione pietatis"), e.g., defense of one's parents, spouse or children.
In my opinion, Father Trosch's claim that Michael Griffin committed a justifiable homicide when he shot Dr. Gunn is not consistent with this moral teaching. Dr. Gunn was obviously not in the act of attacking Michael Griffin. Nor did Michael Griffin have a relationship with either the woman or the fetus based on familial bond or public office. Further, his use of a gun in this act was an immediate and reckless resort to deadly force which would be questionable even if he were defending his own life. One can only conclude that Michael Griffin intended to kill Dr. Gunn and thus chose an immoral means to achieve a putatively good end. On this basis alone, Catholic moral teaching would judge the actions of Michael Griffin to be intrinsically immoral.
One final observation: Catholic moral teaching, while it delineates a right to defense against unjust aggression, does not impose the exercise of this right as a duty in all cases. There may well be a duty, e.g., for the father of a family with dependent children or spouse to defend himself in order to preserve his life. But such a duty depends upon the relationships that bind a person. The tone of Father Trosch's ad could be read as implying that Michael Griffin was somehow duty bound to take action against Dr. Gunn. Catholic moral teaching would not acknowledge the existence of such a duty in this case.
2. A second area of Catholic moral teaching that is applicable to this case may be found in the discussion of the right of individuals to punish moral malefactors or to enforce the civil law against those who violate it. (Cf.
Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 64, aa. 2 and 3, and I-II, Q. 96). Now in the case of abortion, we have a morally sinful act that has been decriminalized in most circumstances by the civil law. From a moral perspective, public policy on abortion in the United States may considered to constitute an unjust law. I will discuss this in the following section. The issue here is the action of individuals to enforce the moral law.
Catholic moral teaching sees the individual always within a social context. The human person is a member of society by nature, and rights, obligations and relationships arise from this fact. Society is ordered toward the common good. Since morally evil and criminal acts detract from the common good, the question arises whether individual members of the society may defend the common good by individual action. The tradition gives a clear and unequivocal answer: No. Human society is an ordered society, and an essential part of that order, reflecting both humanity's rational nature and its divine origin, is the power to legislate and to enforce the common good by coercive or punitive action. However, this power is reserved exclusively to the publicly established civil authority. St. Thomas holds this position (II-II, Q. 64, a. 3), based on St. Augustine's teaching (
De Civitate Dei, i): "A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an evildoer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given him."
In Catholic teaching, abortion is considered an "abominable crime" (
Gaudium et Spes, 51). It carries with it the judgment of God and the penalty of excommunication from the Church. In the mind and practice of the Church, these are sufficient signifiers to indicate the mortally serious nature of the sin of abortion. According to the teaching of the Church, civil society should afford every protection to unborn human life, since by doing so it would truly serve the common good and order its life according to the plan of the Creator and the requirements of human reason. One might even argue that Catholics, as members of the civil society, have a moral obligation to be involved in the social and political life of the nation to ensure that public policy is formed according to these principles. But nowhere in the Catholic moral tradition will one find a justification of individual action to enforce the moral law upon those who may violate it. Vigilantism in the name of morality is an offense against society as a whole and the individuals who are its victims. It is a profoundly immoral act in itself.
3. A third area of Catholic moral teaching that may be brought to bear on this case is the question of an unjust law. Any human law that is contrary to the divine law is by definition unjust and cannot bind in conscience (
Summa Theologiae I-II, Q. 96, a. 4). One of the difficulties with the issue of abortion in the United States is that the public policy of permissive elective abortions has rarely been enacted by positive law. It came about by a decision of the Supreme Court. This makes the task of redressing the injustice of abortion extremely difficult within our constitutional framework.
As horrible as abortion on demand is, we must recognize that its legal status is one that
permits abortion, but
does not command or coerce abortion. No one is bound to perform the act which the law of the United States permits. Were this the case, as it is in China, we would be morally bound to resist the implementation of that law by every morally permissible means. One might even argue that a woman who is legally coerced to have an abortion has the moral right to self-defense, including the use of deadly force.
The teaching of the Catholic Church as it applies to the question of the legal status of abortion in the United States supports the position that one is obligated to do whatever one can within the political and social arenas to change the law. The position and actions adopted by the NCCB/USCC are an excellent example of what is morally required and permitted in order to redress the evil of abortion. Other responsible Pro-Life groups have adopted similar positions and plans of action. Demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience may also serve the moral purpose of changing the law on abortion. But moral or conscientious objection to the legal status of abortion does not give one the moral justification to engage in actions that inflict bodily harm or death on another person.
(Submitted to Archbishop Lipscomb by the Reverend Michael J. Walsh October 21, 1993.)
You Shall Not Murder v Justifiable Homicide Not Kill Addendum
Copyright © 1993-99 by Fr. David C. Trosch - All Rights Reserved
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